Keith Blakelock

Keith Blakelock was killed during riots on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, north London on 6 October 1985.

Three men were convicted of his murder in 1987 but later had their convictions quashed in 1991.

In 2014 another man was tried for his murder but acquitted.

Two other people were arrested for his murder in 2010.

Keith Blakelock was from Sunderland and had been called down to London to provide manpower for expected unrest across London and was deployed to the Broadwater Farm estate after riots broke out there following the death of Cynthia Jarrett from a heart attack during a search of her home by police. He was assigned to a team of police officers who were sent to protect firefighters who were trying to put out fires on the estate.

However, the team were surrounded by rioters whilst they were trying to put out a fire in a supermarket in Tangmere block, and they were charged at as they were leaving the building. As the police ran away Keith Blakelock fell over and was surrounded and attacked. When he was found he had 43 stab wounds and still had a knife stuck in his neck.

It was heard that an attempt had been made to decapitate him and his helmet had been passed around amongst the rioters like a trophy and was never recovered.

It was thought that there had been about 50 people involved in the attack.

His murder was mired in controversy following accusations of racism and corruption, both in the death of Cynthia Jarrett and another woman earlier in the week, and police fabricating evidence against the men initially convicted.

The riots were precipitated after Cynthia Jarrett died from a heart attack after the police searched her home looking for stolen goods. They had earlier arrested her son whilst he was driving a car and suspected that the car was stolen. They had stopped him because his tax disc was out of date. It was then suspected that his car was stolen, which it wasn't and based on another policeman's suspicions that he was known for handling stolen goods, the police went to his home in Thorpe Road about a mile south of the Broadwater Farm Estate to search it. When they arrived, his mother was watching television and she became so alarmed that she had a heart attack and died.

Her death followed the police shooting of Cherry Groce the day before who was shot by mistake in Brixton. The shooting itself sparked riots in Brixton, raising tensions across London.

Following Cynthia Jarrett's death, a march was held to the local police station, however, later that day people started to riot, mainly across the southern part of the Broadwater Farm Estate, including Mount Pleasant Road, Willan Road and The Avenue. Mount Pleasant Road wasn't on the estate, but is a road made up of terraced houses nearby.

During the riot fires were started and police units were called in to protect the fire fighters, and in particular, Keith Blakelock, who was part of a team of ten police officers protecting firefighters who were called in to deal with a fire at a shop in a large block called Tangier. However, the police were attacked and surrounded by rioters, some of whom were wearing crash-helmets and masks and the police ran off. However, Keith Blakelock fell over and was surrounded by the rioters who attacked him with a number of weapons.

Keith Blakelock had been with a small team known as 502, a scratch serial of officers with little riot experience under the command of a senior officer who had arrived with two vans of policemen thinking he would be there to assist other senior officers, but found himself in charge. They had arrived at the eastern end of the estate, thinking that that was where the trouble was due to the number of other emergency response vehicles there.

After some initial skirmishes near Martlesham block it was noted that there was a fire at Tangmere block and after being advised by the firemen that it could get serious the senior officer walked on to the estate alone to test the water and found that he was unchallenged. He was then followed by some firefighters that went up onto the deck inside Tangmere block where the fire was. However, they were then attacked by rioters and forced back.

It was thought that that initial encounter had caused some of the rioters to go off and get other people, either to fight the firefighters or loot the shops.

However the senior officer then gave the order for his team to go in and support the firefighters in their effort to put the fires out. However, when the firefighters reached the deck they came under fierce attack and were ordered to retreat. Although being attacked by a mob of between 30 and 50 rioters, they managed to get down the stairs from the deck, through the carpark and then onto the grass area beyond. However, it was there that Keith Blakelock fell over and he was attacked from all sides, being stabbed repeatedly.

However, another officer in his group turned to see a group surrounding someone and went in to help, hitting a man aged 40-50 with curly black hair going grey and causing him to run off. He said that he then hit another rioter with his truncheon and the group ran off. He said that he then got Keith Blakelock by his thong and started to drag him away, and made some ground but was then attacked by rioters with machetes and was hit in the knee and that someone then grabbed his truncheon and that he then dropped the thong that he was dragging Keith Blakelock with and ran off.

Several other police officers were seriously injured in the affray. including the senior officer, but two managed to pick Keith Blakelock up, who was still alive at that time, but after two or three strides he collapsed. He still had a wooden handled knife sticking out the back of his neck.

It was later said that the attack lasted only a matter of seconds, with Keith Blakelock slipping on the grass, being then surrounded by rioters, but with the other officer soon dispersing them and dragging Keith Blakelock to the roadway. He was then taken to North Middlesex Hospital but was found to be dead on arrival.

Following the murder the police started their investigation.

There was no photographic or forensic evidence of the murder and the police started interviewing people, often resulting in complains that youths were being interviewed with no access to solicitors or family. However, the police eventually found a witness who said he saw the murder and who identified three teenagers as having been involved, they being aged 14, 15 and 13. They were known as X, Y and Z.

During their interrogation the police said that they mentioned Winston Silcott and suspected that he had been a ring leader in the murder.

When they questioned him he refused to answer questions, however, he eventually made two comments regarding the youths that had implicated him which formed the backbone of the prosecution against him.

He said:

and when he was asked whether he murdered Keith Blakelock he said:

Based on that Winston Silcott and two other men, 19-year-old Engin Raghip and 20-year-old Mark Braithwaite were charged with murder along with the three teenagers. Both Engin Raghip and Mark Braithwaite were said to have made confessions. They were tried on the basis that they had been involved in a joint enterprise and as such there was no need to prove who struck the fatal blows.

Although six people had admitted their role in the murder, it was noted that the prosecution only had one witness, the man that had identified X which had then led the police to identify the other suspects, and it was shown in court that he had lied in order to avoid a long prison sentence.  It was then further noted that the confessions of X, Y and Z were unreliable after it was found that they had been held for long periods alone without access to solicitors or their family. The judge described the confession of X as fantastical, strange and make believe. The judge then acquitted all of the teenagers.

However, Winston Silcott, Engin Raghip and Mark Braithwaite were all convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

However, their case was appealed in 1990 and their convictions quashed in 1991. In particular it was heard that the statement that Winston Silcott made regarding the police never getting the kids to court had been inserted into the original notes later. It was also further heard that a confession was also false and had been modified by the police and as such, the convictions were found to be unsafe.

A further investigation in 1993 was criticised for separating the kickers and the stabbers in the murder, which was done in an effort to encourage witnesses, in particular the kickers, to come forward so that they could build a case against the stabbers.

In 1994 two police officers were tried for fabricating evidence but acquitted.

In 2003 a number of further arrests were made, but no one was prosecuted.

In 2005 the police released pictures of Keith Blakelock's overalls which showed the places where he had been stabbed.

In 2010 Nicholas Jacobs was interviewed again. He had originally been arrested five days after the murder and later convicted for affray and detained for five years. It was noted that whilst in prison in 1998 he had written a rap poem implicating him in the murder. He was charged in 2013 and tried in 2014 but acquitted.

Extracts of the poem read:

He was also said to have been seen by a man that admitted to having kicked Keith Blakelock. The man, who was known as John Brown at the trial, said that Nicholas Jacobs had been a nutter and out to get blood on the night of the riots. He said that he saw Nicholas Jacobs lunging wildly with a machete-type weapon at Keith Blakelock.

John Brown added that after Keith Blakelock fell that the crowd went crazy and that they shouted:

Another witness, a man that had served time in Pentonville Prison with Nicholas Jacobs said that he told him that he had got two stabs in at Keith Blakelock and said that he had seen a group that included Nicky Jacobs trying to:

However, it was noted that although Nicholas Jacobs was identified in street photographs during the riot, he was not identified in any of the photographs taken during a 50-minute period during which Keith Blakelock was murdered.

Nicholas Jacobs was eventually acquitted.

Broadwater Farm was built in 1971 on marshy ground originally intended for allotments. It was noted that the stark architecture of the structure, consisting of concrete pillars supporting massive platforms linked by elevated walkways, was in marked contrast to the surrounding streets which were of Victorian terraces. The design of the flats and access routes however made residents and visitors easy victims for burglary and robbery.

Broadwater’s initial popularity among tenants’ waned after about three years and thereafter the refusal rate to be housed on the estate increased significantly compared with the rest of the borough. As such, having failed to attract tenants on the council waiting list, the estate was then used to house those in particular need, such as single parent families, the homeless and the elderly.

It was stated then that the unbalanced social mix meant the estate lacked a community spirit and that the absence of any kind of reasonable family life exacerbated the lack of social control on a younger generation at odds with society as a whole.

It was said that the downward spiral in the fortunes of the estate continued and that by the mid 70s three quarters of the housing vacancies were being taken by the homeless, and in 1978 measures were adopted to halt the decline and improve its appearance which had some success in improving general morale.

By the autumn of 1980 a decision was made to revert to the earlier process of housing allocation and the estate saw an increase in the proportion of households comprising those from the ‘New Commonwealth’, and young single parents and a brittle relationship developed between some of the white predominantly elderly tenants and some of the newer residents.

In 1981 the tenants’ association asked the police to open a police office to help combat the rising crime and reduce anxiety felt by many of the residents, however, the move was not altogether welcomed by the young black residents who saw it as constituting an oppressive presence on the estate.

In 1982 a single home beat officer on the estate was joined by another in an effort to increase police cover and improve relationships, and they were both the subject to serious attacks by black youths during that year.

In August 1983 the Broadwater Farm Panel was formed, made up of the local authority, tenants’ association and youth association, it being noted that the police were not initially allowed to participate, although the issues were later resolved and they were.

Later in 1983 a neighbourhood office was established to deal with complaints, housing allocation and the day to day running of the estate, and subsequent work began to install anti-crime measures such as secure doors, intercom systems and unbreakable glass in communal areas.

In 1982 the police presence was increased to a sergeant and eight constables which resulted in appreciable success in 1983 and 1984, bringing about some reduction in the levels of crime although some of the reduction was thought could have been due to the increased security of property.

However, the estate gained a reputation for drug trafficking, particularly in the car park area and as a haven for the business of handling stolen property, features which became more marked in the summer of 1985.

It was reported that it would be difficult to define ‘normality’ in respect of Broadwater Farm. It had an unenviable reputation and normal policing methods were resisted by a vociferous ill-disposed minority. Gratuitous abuse and violence towards police became an almost daily occurrence during periods of tension and the throwing of bricks, bottles, beer barrels and lumps of concrete became so frequent that police officers had to be as concerned for their own safety as much as their general policing responsibilities.

As such, it was stated that morale in the police began to suffer and some local senior officers were singled out for criticism because of their apparent unwillingness to take steps to remedy matters, although it was noted that they had in fact been as frustrated as their officers by the sheer impossibility of the situation.

It was stated then that, senior management, who although had a clear commitment to develop community policing, began to recognise that too much tolerance and ignoring more minor criminal offences would lead to impatience and resentment among the junior ranks and that some residents might misunderstand police motives. However, although decisions were not easy and the balance difficult to maintain, relations did improve between the police and the hostile minority during periods of relatively low tension.

However, despite the efforts, acts of violence against the police continued.

On 12 August 1982 a home beat officer, whilst visiting the youth association’s office by invitation was hit over the head from behind with a bottle whilst talking to a woman there.

On 2 November 1982, two metal beer kegs were dropped from one of the high level walkways on to a police car driven by an inspector and later in the same day a local home beat officer was ambushed by black youths and struck on the head with a billiard cue, and suffered a serious injury.

On 4 August 1983 a constable was standing alongside a police van that he had driven onto the estate to collect other officers when he was stabbed in the back by a black youth.

In May 1985 an attempt by the police to detain a black youth led to confrontation between the police and members of the youth association, resulting in the youth being forcibly removed from police custody.

In June 1985 there was a confrontation after 50-60 youths demonstrated outside Tottenham Police Station following an arrest after a rumour spread that the police had beaten the prisoner. However, the situation was calmed after the head of the youth association was allowed to see the prisoner and the group dispersed.

On Sunday 14 July 1985, two officers had occasion to stop two young mem on the estate and to question them about their possession of a pair of handcuffs. Further enquiries led to the discovery of cheque and credit cards in their possession. However, at that point the officers became surrounded by an extremely hostile crowd of black people who abused the officers, one of whom was black himself, resulting in the black policeman later stating that he was in no doubt that he would be the target of physical assault of he ever went onto the estate again.

Less than a week later, on Wednesday 17 July 1985, the police chased a stolen vehicle on to the estate and were immediately attacked with milk bottles thrown by a number of youths. In the course of the general melee a police vehicle sustained some damage and the situation was judged to be so serious that all police were withdrawn from the estate until the area quietened down.

During the next six weeks, a total of ten incidents were reported, all of which involved either the throwing of bottles at patrolling police officers, or shouting of abusive remarks. On 6 September 1985, the London Fire Brigade came under attack from black youths on the estate and the following day a local authority removal team were physically stopped from clearing the area of abandoned vehicles. A second attempt by them was met with an attack by missiles and they were again forced to abandon their task.

As a result of the failed attempts to remove the vehicles, representations were made to the London Borough of Haringey to leave the abandoned vehicles on the estate as it was found that they were seen as a source of income to the youths there who sold spare parts.

It was noted that by then, even workmen on the estate were the target of youths throwing bottles.

One particularly serious incident took place on 11 September 1985 when two officers who were patrolling the 4^th level of Tangmere block were attacked. They had noticed a number of black youths gathering on the landing below them after which a man came up the stairs and walked past them. As he did so, the youths below shouted:

At that point the officers decided to leave, but before they could do so, two men dressed in army combat jackets and masks ran up the stairs and approached the officers. After a short and aggressive argument, one of the men began to draw an object from his pocket which one of the officers suspected to be a knife and he said:

They then forced the officers down the stairs and told them to :

Black youths were stood in two lines on either side of the walkway and as the constables passed, the youth’s chanted:

Then, no sooner were they clear of the line that they were subjected to a barrage of bottles and bricks and they were both seriously injured.

On 17 September 1985 and again on 19 September 1985, unconfirmed reports reached the police to the effect that petrol was being syphoned from the tanks of parked cars on the estate.

On 20 September 1985, the Asian owned supermarket on the deck of Tangmere block was daubed with racial graffiti. However, those responsible were not known to the police, but it was noted that it was significant that that shop was one of only two premises on the estate, both Asian owned, that were subsequently singled out for firebombing by the rioters.

On 22 September 1985 a black man was shot in the resident’s club in Stapleford block and another black man charged with the offence.

In the week immediately preceding the riot, persistent rumours circulated predicting a major disturbance at Wood Green shopping centre, which was not far from the estate, and some substance was given to them following a series of incidents involved groups of black youths.

On the night of the Brixton riots, 28 September 1985, there were reports of a large number of youths gathering in Wood Green wearing helmets and balaclavas, however, no disorder ensued.

On 1 October 1985 at 4.30pm there was an emergency call to a robbery in Gloucester Road, however, it proved to be a false call. However, at 5.08pm an actual robbery, involving 20-25 masked black youths took place at a Post Office in Mount Pleasant Road about a quarter of a mile away.

Later on 1 October 1985 there was a call to Tottenham Police Station that 40-50 youths armed with petrol bombs had gathered on the estate, which was followed by reports that petrol bombs had been thrown. However, nothing was damaged and the police found nothing to confirm the reports.

On 2 October 1985 a petrol bomb was found in a drain under one of the walkways on the estate and later the same day more information was received that bottles were being collected by youths in the area.

On 3 October 1985, just after 10pm, a hoax 999 call was made claiming that two police officers were being attacked on the estate by 20 black youths, however, there had been no officers in the vicinity at the time.

On 4 October 1985, Post Office officials reported to police that postmen delivering mail to the estate were being subjected to harassment by youths. Later the same day a person who was arrested for a drug offence told the police that petrol bombs were being stored somewhere on the estate, but the exact location was never determined.

On Saturday 5 October 1985, after Cynthia Jarret’s death, home beat officers noted that the estate was ‘unnervingly quiet’. At 7.30pm bottles were thrown at police, but there was no indication that that was related to the death of Cynthia Jarret.

It was noted that not unnaturally, the disturbances that occurred at Toxteth, Handsworth and Brixton earlier in 1985, also made a contribution towards heightening tension on the Broadwater Farm Estate. For example, following those events there were reports of youths on the estate imitating those incidents by walking about wearing masks and balaclava helmets.

It was added that the tensions that existed were also undoubtedly exploited by a hard core of 50-60 criminals intent on ensuring that their lucrative trade in drugs and other criminal activity could continue unchecked.

Following the general increase in tension, it was decided to open a District Control Room at Wood Green police station on 5 October 1985, with a reserve of police under the command of a local senior officer to combat any disorder, which had, in the light of earlier reports, been essentially to provide security for the two main shopping centres at Tottenham High Road and Wood Green High Road.

Cynthia Jarret’s son had been arrested at 12.55pm on 5 October 1985 after which a search warrant was obtained for a search to be made at his home at 25 Thorpe Road, about a mile south of Broadwater Farm Estate where he lived with his mother. When the police went to the address to search it, Cynthia Jarret collapsed and died. Her inquest later returned a verdict of accidental death.

It was noted that within hours of her death that the acting commander of the district visited the family and expressed his condolences on their bereavement, and that he in addition outlined the procedure for the investigation into the death and that it would be carried out by an independent senior police officer. A police statement was also issued expressing regret that the death had occurred.

The following day, 6 October 1985, at 1.45am, following a visit by Cynthia Jarret’s family to Tottenham Police Station, including her son, who had been bailed, in furtherance of their complaint, a crowd gathered outside the station, made up of about 30 black people and four windows were broken, but the crowd soon dispersed after Cynthia Jarret’s relations persuaded them to leave.

The following morning, Sunday 5 October 1985, local police incited members of the local community to meet to discuss the growing problems resulting from the death of Cynthia Jarret, and as a result, a meeting took place at Tottenham Police Station. The meeting was chaired by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner who was accompanied by the local Divisional Chief Superintendent, and included the following:

• Deputy Major, London Borough of Haringey.
• Councillor, London Borough of Haringey.
• Chief Executive.
• Member of Haringey Police Consultative Committee.
• Chairman of Haringey Community Relations Council.
• Senior Community Relations Officer.
• Council, Police Liaison Committee.
• Youth Leader.
• Two of Cynthia Jarret’s sons.

After a lengthy discussion it was agreed by those present that:

1. All parties would appeal for calm within the community.
2. The enquiry into the death should be completed expeditiously.
3. The community leaders would demand the report be made public.
4. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner would pass the report to the Police Complaints Authority.

Whilst the meeting was taking place, a crowd of about 50 gathered outside the police station, and apart from minor damage, the crowd confined itself to verbal abuse, directed at the police, which included threats to kill, or rape their family members and included several threats to take revenge on the police later that day, the time of 7pm being mentioned.

Some of the police present felt that the threats were mere rhetoric and had served to release the tension. However, other officers were convinced that trouble would follow, as darkness fell.

The more optimistic assessment was conveyed to the control room at Wood Green police station, which had already opened at 8am in anticipation of disorder occurring, which was to affect a decision later that day to release some manpower.

In the light of the prevailing atmosphere it was decided that police should not continue routine patrolling on the estate and both home beat officers were deployed on the periphery of the estate. At 3.15pm, just before the demonstrators dispersed from outside the police station, the two officers went to an address in The Avenue to investigate a complaint that someone had fired an airgun at the windows of a house. Whilst they were there they noticed a crowd of black youths gathering outside, some of whom were armed with bricks. The demeanour of the youths was such that the officers feared for their own safety and left the house. However, as they did, they were subjected to a barrage of missiles and a section of broken paving stone struck one officer in the back with some force.

In the hours that followed the attack on the home beat officers, five 999 calls were made by residents of the Broadwater Farm Estate concerning the movements of up to 100 youths, some of them wearing masks, who were alleged to have been running through the estate banging on doors. However, the police didn’t respond to the calls, having first established that no actual damage had been caused although the calls were genuine, as it was considered that a police response could provoke confrontation and disorder.

There then followed a period of quiet, lasting nearly two hours, when no calls of any kind were made from the estate, and it was later determined that a meeting of youths was being held at the premises of the Broadwater Farm Youth Association. It was later claimed that a decision was made at the meeting to mount another ‘peaceful’ demonstration outside Tottenham Police Station. However, it was noted that given the extent to which the youths were subsequently found to have armed themselves with petrol bombs, knives and machetes, doubt had to exist as to the validity of that claim. That period of relative calm was first broken at 6.09pm when a 999 call was received from an address in The Avenue, to the effect that 15 masked black youths had broken a window. It had been a genuine call, but when the police arrived at about 6.15pm there were no youths in evidence.

Another call was made at 6.25pm via the 999 system, in which information was given that two youths had been detained at Willan Road for car theft. However, the call could not be checked back to the informant and it was subsequently thought to have been a hoax designed to draw the police into the estate.

In view of the doubts about the call, the duty inspector went to the vicinity himself to see what, if anything, was happening, and whilst driving along The Avenue, near to the estate, two black youths wearing helmets drew up alongside him on a motor cycle and one of them smashed a beer bottle into the near front window which broke and scattered glass into the inspector’s eyes. However, he managed to drive away.

At about the same time, Wood Green control began to release police reserve units, a decision that was later regarded as clearly premature and was put down to them not receiving any of the information about what was happening elsewhere.

It was concluded that the decision to release the reserves was put down to the following:

1. There had been a constructive meeting with community members and the area was quiet, with the incident in The Avenue having been radioed in as a minor one.
2. The small demonstration outside Tottenham police station had seemed to have acted as a ‘safety valve’, venting pent up emotions, with the alternative interpretation of the demonstration suggesting violence after darkness fell not being received.
3. Many of the reserve officers had been on duty since 7am and were due to be replaced by fresh officers, of whom 250 were shield trained. In addition some of the personnel carriers had to return to convey fresh reserves back to Wood Green.
4. The controller was aware that an additional 450 shield trained officers were available and that that number could be supplemented by another 250 officers.

The overall impression so far as Wood Green control was concerned was that the threat of disorder was receding. However, it was later accepted that had an accurate picture of developments been available, that police could have forestalled the disorder by the immediate deployment of uniformed officers on the estate which would have been in accordance with the plans for such a contingency. It was noted that contrary to some press reports, the contingency plans were considered, but it was not thought necessary at the time to implement it.

It was also noted that on the Sunday, in anticipation of disorder, a substantial reserve of manpower had been available to operate in two shifts, and that it appeared that when the shifts were changing over that the progress of the off0duty officers southwards through Tottenham enroute to their home divisions was interpreted as a deployment to ‘seal off’ the estate, and that that mistaken belief was recorded in the reports of both the GLC Police Committee and the Haringey Police Sub-Committee.

The attack on the police inspector in his car occurred some minutes after the 999 call at 6.25pm, and between then and 7.02pm, other emergency calls were made to which support units responded, but although youths were seen, no disorder was seen.

At 7.05pm, when one of those police units was in The Avenue, a crowd of about 200 youths attacked the vehicle with bricks, petrol bombs and machetes. It was noted that but for the added protection to the bodywork of the vehicle, the occupants would have been seriously injured or perhaps killed.

Both units withdrew and reserves began to arrive in the area at 7.10pm and at 7.20pm senior officers were deployed to the seats of disorder to take command of units on the ground.

During the next twenty minutes there was intense activity by the rioters on the estate, and vehicles were overturned and set on fire to act as barricades at the four vehicle access points to the estate at Gloucester Road, Willan Road, Griffin Road and Adams Road, which were some 400 yards apart. It was said that the speed at which the barricades were effected suggested a degree of planning and organisation to prevent access by the police to the estate and as a means of delaying an effective police response.

The violence during the riots centred on the four locations where barricades had been established. Police shield units took up position at these locations and came under a barrage of bricks and petrol bombs. One unit of twenty officers, made an advance into the estate in an effort to drive back the rioters, but as they reached the car park area below Martlesham block they came under a sustained attack from rioters armed with knives, machetes, iron bars, hammers and other dangerous weapons. They were forced to withdraw and several members of the unit suffered serious injury.

Officers who had been part of that advance were stated to have been clearly of the opinion that there had been pools of petrol on the ground, with one officer saying that he could detect it days later on a document that he had had in his trouser pocket when he had fallen. It was stated that if the petrol had been ignited that the effect would have been devastating. However, other commentators fiercely denied that that had been the case.

However, it was noted that it was clear that the rioters had amassed a considerable quantity of petrol on the estate and petrol bombs were thrown at the police over a sustained period as well as plastic bags filled with petrol that were thrown and which exploded on impact. Petrol was also poured from a metal keg by a group of youths on a balcony on to officers below on stairways. At one stage a group of officers made a short advance forward to find themselves silhouetted from behind by an ignited wall of petrol which made withdrawal extremely dangerous.

By about 8pm a pattern of behaviour by the rioters had been established. About 200 to 300 youths would emerge from under the tower blocks and attack one or more of the barricaded locations with bricks and petrol bombs. There was evidence of a degree of organisation in that and particular individuals were observed on several occasions giving directions to others by words or gestures. Then, after each attack, when  their ammunition was exhausted, the rioters withdrew to re-arm and then attack again, either at the same location, or at one of the other locations.

The most ferocious attacks were made at Griffin Road and Adams Road, where the defended positions were so close to the overhead balconies and walkways that any attempt by police to advance was met by a barrage of missiles from above.

Willan Road was more easily defended, even so, the police were subjected to attack by blazing vehicles being driven at them and the level of violence was severe.

In Griffin Road the police were subjected to a particularly sustained attack by rioters armed with deadly weapons, including firearms, and at 9.30pm the level of violence there was so ferocious that there was a danger of mounting numbers of serious casualties within police ranks unless the crowd was subdued.

Other reports detailing the initial violence stated that the rioters were not intent on engaging with the police until they found that their way out from the estate was blocked and that most people were just thinking of getting out. A youth that was present said that when they first moved towards the police lines they found that they were just standing there and that someone threw a rock at them and that there was then an eerie silence as it flew through the air, and that when it passed over the shields there was a groan as of a policeman being hit. The youth said that everyone then moved away from the youth that threw the rock thinking that a snatch squad would come out for him, but nothing happened. He said that another rock was thrown and then another and that after that, realising that the police were not going to do anything the riot started in earnest, it being stated that the rioters were delighted that the police were such easy targets.

Other observers behind the police lines noted the constant stream of ambulances taking wounded police officers off to hospital, stating that as soon as one was filled and left, another would take its place. The police cleared the road to North Middlesex Hospital two miles away, but the hospital soon became full and the ambulances were then directed to Whittington in Archway, four miles away.

It was also said that some of the policemen with experience of the miner’s strike and with riot gear begged to be allowed to advance, stating that with their NATO flameproof overalls they would have the riot over in two hours, however, they were not allowed.

It was also noted that whilst the police had sealed up the roads to the east, and along The Avenue that the area to the north was totally open and that all sorts of people were coming and going, many of whom had no relationship with the area or Cynthia Jarret’s family.

It was also noted that 200 riot police in full gear were kept at Wood Green and were not brought in to support the front lines which they could hear were taking a beating over the police radios.

Much of the problems were said to have been due to communications because the radio systems were not designed to work from within the riot helmets that the police used and officers could not hear what was being said on their radios.

The situation and general severity of the violence at the various locations was said to have resulted in so many serious injuries to police officers and showed such grave risk to life that the overall incident commander obtained the Commissioner’s authority to use baton rounds and officers of the Tactical Firearms unit were sent to forward positions, arriving in place at 10.20pm, but by that time the level of violence had decreased and baton rounds were not used.

However, two Asian shops, some distance from the main violence, and situated on the deck of Tangmere block were firebombed and the fire brigade were called out. The fire brigade then became concerned that the fire would spread to the occupied flats above and the divisional chief superintendent decided to deploy a small number of police with the fire brigade so that the brigade could extinguish the fire.

In reaching that decision it was recognised that incursion by police at that time into the estate had an element of risk but that that was outweighed by the danger to the public if the fire was allowed to burn unchecked. In the event the group of officers who entered the estate from Gloucester Road with the Fire Brigade came under a vicious attack by a heavily armed  gang of youths who materialised from elsewhere and Keith Blakelock was murdered during the attack.

Whilst the main disorder continued within Broadwater Farm, groups of youths congregated on the periphery of the estate at a number of places. Many were merely spectators, but some were apparently intent on joining the rioters, and unable to get past the police lines, they created minor disturbances, which included the throwing of some petrol bombs in the streets immediately to the east. However, a number of police units were deployed during the evening to deal with them and the situation was largely contained.

The attacks on the police gradually reduced in severity and had largely abated by midnight, although information was received from a resident as late as 11.45pm that large groups of youths were still gathered in the darkness beneath the tower blocks, apparently lying in wait for the police. As such, in the light of that information and the fact that firearms had been used against the police on several occasions during the evening, it was not thought appropriate to enter the estate immediately after the level of violence had fallen, when there was a clear likelihood of ambush and it was thought necessary to carefully plan the police entry into the estate and the police moved in at 4am.

A report into the riot described the violence seen as unprecedented, with one police officer murdered, 255 police officers injured and of that latter figure, seven having gunshot wounds. It was also noted that the rioters had demonstrated a degree of organisation, with their planned attacks on police lines being vicious and sustained over a lengthy period.

A police report added:

Following the riots a report called the Gifford Report was made which looked into the causes of the riots and made 12 important recommendations, five of them concerning the police and seven concerning other organisations connected with the estate.

The report concluded that the riots were not planned by residents of the estate.

However, another report, the Richards Report contrasted with the Gifford Report in regards to the events leading up to the riot. The Gifford report stated that it had found that there was evidence of a degree of organisation during the riot itself, with witnesses hearing two black men ordering 'more ammunition', and of others responding by making petrol bombs. The report also stated that one witness claimed that as many as 50 bombs were made in five minutes and that two witnesses had seen four men in hoods and bomber jackets moving among the crowd signalling to each other.

The report noted that when residents were asked about the main problems on the estate, that police behaviour was near the end of the list, with unemployment, housing and lack of facilities for adolescents and children being at the top.

The Gifford Report was 256 pages long and covered broader aspects of the events, and included making recommendations such that police interviews were recorded.

Tangmere was demolished in 2023.